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ABSTRACT
Decentralization, which has backed the hyper growth of
many blockchains, comes at the cost of scalability. To un-
derstand this fundamental limitation, this paper proposes
a quantitative measure of blockchain decentralization, and
discusses its implications to various trust models and consen-
sus algorithms. Further, we identify the major challenges in
blockchain decentralization. Our key findings are that true
decentralization is hard to achieve due to the skewed mining
power and that a fully decentralized blockchain inherently
limits scalability as it incurs a throughput upper bound and
prevents scaling smart contract execution. To address these
challenges, we outline three research directions to explore
the trade-offs between decentralization and scalability.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the invention of Bitcoin [18], cryptocurrencies are gain-
ing enormous popularity. As of April 2018, two most popular
cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum [25], have 135.8 and
49.8 billions USD market capitalization, respectively [4]. One
key innovation pioneered by Bitcoin and adopted by many
other cryptocurrencies is running consensus protocols with
open membership on top of cryptographic data structures
called blockchains. As a result, trust of the currencies can be
shifted from centralized control to crypto properties together
with the consensus protocol.
The idea of combining consensus protocols and blockchains
reaches far beyond cryptocurrencies. This idea was extended
to build secure ledgers for generalized transactions, namely,
smart contracts. And according to the decentralization level
of blockchain providers, blockchain systems can be classified
into public chains, consortium chains, and private chains.
Public chains usually use incentivized consensus protocols,
such as Nakamoto consensus [18], that allow anyone to join.
Consortium chains only allow permissioned participants join
the consensus process. And there is only a single participant
or dictator in consensus of private chains.
Strong decentralization enables the freedom of not trust-
ing any particular blockchain providers or authorities while
still ensuring the trustworthy of the whole system. However,
this freedom is not free. In this paper, we aim to address the
following questions.
∗Thiswork doesn’t represent the opinion of the authors’ employers. Epichain
is a blockchain initiative started by the authors (http://epichain.io).
How to quantify decentralization? We first define cen-
tralization level, a quantitative measure that captures the
extent of centralization of blockchains. This measure reflects
the distributions of transactions contributed by blockchain
providers. Then, we conduct case studies and compare the
centralization levels of different blockchains. (Sec. 3).
What are the problems with decentralization? We dis-
cuss blockchains in details by breaking down its system
stack into multiple layers: physical nodes, platform software,
smart contracts, and clients. We report three major problems
with decentralizaiton in these layers: 1) In physical layer,
the assumption of decentralization of mining power does
not hold since the real-world mining power distribution is
highly skewed. 2) In platform software layer, decentralization
causes inherent scalability problems of transaction through-
put. We prove a low upper bound of transaction throughput
of decentralized blockchains, which is independent of the
choices of specific protocols. 3) In smart contract layer, cur-
rent decentralized blockchains do fully replicated execution
and sequential programming models, which prevent scaling
the smart contract execution. (Sec. 4).
Research opportunities. These problems highlight key
challenges in blockchain research. There are several worth
exploring directions. For example, to democratize mining
powers, new crypto hash algorithms that are hard for ASIC
exploit significant marginal performance could be used. In
order to overcome the scalability of transaction throughput,
we should explore alternative means of ensuring trust, for
example, formal verification, verifiable computation, and se-
cured hardware, rather than purely rely on decentralizaiton.
To scale smart contract execution, a promising direction is to
co-design new programming model and runtime for smart
contract that allows parallel execution (Sec. 5).
2 BACKGROUND
A blockchain is a distributed ledger of transactions that
provides both a trusted computing platform and a tamper-
proof history. To provide a trusted computing platform, a
blockchain often requires multiple system nodes to perform
the same transaction and builds consensus on the majority.
To provide a tamper-proof history, a blockchain uses chained
hashes to provide crypto proofs of serialized transactions to
defend against double-spending attacks.
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Bitcoin [18] is generally considered the first widely used
blockchain. To perform a transaction, a user requests system
nodes to send Bitcoins from her address to another address,
and also attaches a signature to prove its authenticity. A sys-
tem node (a.k.a., miner) makes sure that Bitcoins are spent by
rightful owners and if so execute the transaction. To commit
the results of transactions to the ledger, an honest miner
selects the longest chain produced by all miners, validates
existing transactions on the chain, appends a block of trans-
actions to the chain, and produces a hash that wraps the
new block and the hash of the previous block. Miners are
required to solve crypto-puzzles, known as Proof of Work
(PoW), to make sure that one block is built about every ten
minutes globally. To reach consensus from open pools of min-
ers, Bitcoin economically incentivizes miners to append to
the longest chain, which is called Nakamoto consensus [18].
Nakamoto consensus tolerates Byzantine faults as long as
more than 50% computing power is controlled by honest
system nodes.
Ethereum [25] is a blockchain that generalizes transactions
of cryptocurrencies into generic state transitions, while stick-
ing tomost system components being proposed in Bitcoin. To
support generic state transitions, Ethereum proposed smart
contracts written in the Solidity programming language [21].
Transaction fees (a.k.a., gas) depend on the amount of system
resources being consumed, which are calculated by Ethereum
virtual machine. Smart contracts are abstracted as accounts;
running a smart contract is similar to depositing to an ac-
count. Similar to Bitcoin, the Ethereum system makes sure
that a smart contract is correctly executed and that state
of a smart contract is tamper-proof. There are blockchain
platforms that provides similar functionalities like Ethereum
but uses different consensus protocols. For example, EOS [8]
replaces Ethereum’s Nakamoto consensus with delegated
proof of stake (see more details in Sec. 3.2).
Hyperledger Fabric. Not all applications require the min-
ing process to be open. IBM introduced Hyperledger Fab-
ric [13] that uses permissioned nodes to build blockchains
and that supports smart contracts written in regular pro-
gramming languages. There are two key differences between
Fabric and fully open blockchains. One, Fabric does not in-
clude economics in its design, meaning that the system runs
without economic incentives. Two, the permissioned Fabric
does not need Nakamoto consensus but instead uses tradi-
tional consensus algorithms (e.g., practical Byzantine fault
tolerance). Hyperledger Fabric is favored by closed consor-
tiums (e.g., financial institutions).
Summary. Depending on the openness of system nodes,
blockchains can be classified into public, consortium, and
private chains. Bitcoin and Ethereum are public blockchains
that run on P2P networks. Public chains do not require app
Figure 1: Cumulative distributions of the number of
transactions by providers (mining power).
developers or app users to trust miners, as long as more than
50% of computing power is not compromised. Hyperledger
Fabric is consortium blockchains that are run by permis-
sioned nodes. In consortium chains, a system node is often
a member of a consortium. Private chains run on a single
system node, and are thus permissioned. Both app devel-
opers and app users have to trust the node not to compute
wrong results, not to deny a transaction, and not to tamper
the history. Therefore, the trust model that private chains
provide is indifferent from that of a cloud provider.
3 AN ANALYSIS OF DECENTRALIZATION
Decentralization has been a key component of blockchains to
democratize trust. Specifically, much attention has been paid
to the decentralization of system nodes. This section formally
defines decentralization as a quantitative measure, and uses
this measure to analyze a few blockchain improvements.
3.1 Measure
We use centralization level to formally define decentraliza-
tion of blockchains. A blockchain is Nϵ centralized if the top
N nodes performed more than 1 − ϵ fraction of transactions.
Given the same ϵ , a blockchain is more centralized if it has
a smaller N . Fig. 1 shows the centralization of public, con-
sortium, and private chains respectively. As long as a small
enough ϵ is given, a public chain’s centralization level can
incur a large N , meaning a low level of centralization. How-
ever, a consortium chain often incurs a small centralization
level N0 when ϵ = 0. An extreme case of consortium chain
is private chain, which is fully centralized (N0 = 1).
Based on the definition of centralization level, we further
look at the level of central trust. Nakamoto consensus re-
quires 51% of compute power, or any form of mining, to be
trusted in order to tolerate Byzantine faults. Thus, a public
chain’s level of central trust isT = N0.49. Practical Byzantine
fault tolerance (PBFT) requires (2n+1)/(3n+1) ≈ 67% nodes
to be trusted to tolerate Byzantine faults. Thus, a consortium
chain’s central trust level is T = N0.33. Similarly, a private
2
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Type Centralization Level Central Trust Consensus Mining Examples
Public Nϵ , ∃ c, ϵ > 0→ Nϵ > c N0.49 Nakamoto PoW, PoS, DPoS Bitcoin, Ethereum, EOS
Consortium Nϵ , ∃ c → N0 < c N0.33 PBFT N/A Hyperledger Fabric
Private N0 = 1 1 N/A N/A N/A
Table 1: Centralization levels, trust models, and consensus algorithms of three kinds of blockchains.
chain’s central trust level is T = 1. Here, lower trust level
means more central trust.
Table 1 summarizes centralization levels, central trust, and
consensus algorithms of the three kinds of blockchains. The
formal definition of decentralization enables us to quanti-
tatively analyze decentralization and scalability of multiple
blockchain improvements.
3.2 Analysis of PoS and DPoS
The process to solve a crypto-puzzle (Proof of Work) is com-
putationally intensive. Thus, Proof of Stake (PoS) is proposed
to save compute power.When building a block, aminer needs
to deposit stake into a contract to win the block-building
chance, which is proportional to the amount of stake. A
faulty participant’s deposit (stake) will be taken to penalize
misbehavior. The centralization level of a PoS blockchain de-
pends on the distribution of stake, instead of that of compute
power which is highly skewed (Sec. 4.1).
Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) does not require every
participant to directly build blocks. Instead, participants can
delegate a miner. DPoS reduced the number of miners in
consensus, but at the same time makes a participant harder
to directly build a block, which incurs an impact to the trust
model. As Delegated Proof of Stake reduced the number
of miners to build blocks, the centralization level would in-
crease. For example, EOS allows twenty-one large entities
to build blocks, incurring a centralization level of N0 = 21
which is more centralized than fully open blockchains that
run PoW or PoS.
3.3 Analysis of Sharding
It is well known that Bitcoin and Ethereum have limited
scalability, with less than fifteen transactions per second [10,
19]. A key issue is that all the system nodes work on one
blockchain. Similar to other distributed systems, sharding [11],
or partitioning, would be a promising approach to improve
scalability. With sharding, the system requires a transac-
tion to be verified only by a small subset of nodes, and thus
handles multiple transactions in parallel. Although no imple-
mentation is finished yet, blockchain communities consider
sharding as the future of blockchains.
Let us assume that a blockchain system is evenly sharded
into k partitions. If the throughput (transactions per second)
of a blockchain without sharding is t , that of the sharded
blockchain would be kt . Because only 1/k nodes would join
the process of performing a transaction, the centralization
level with sharding would be Nϵ/k . This means that the
centralization-throughput product (CTP) stays constant given
an evenly sharded blockchain. If a blockchain is not evenly
sharded, the worst case would incur a smaller CTP, meaning
either more centralized or less scalable.
3.4 Analysis of Lightning Network
Lightning Network [20] improved scalability by offloading
transactions off the blockchain (off-chain). To do so, two
clients can set up a channel on the main blockchain (on-
chain) indicating an upper bound of payments and a timeout.
It is guaranteed cryptographically that payments within the
upper bound and the timeout would be secure even if pay-
ments were taken off-chain. As of the setup, the two clients
can make payments off-chain. When the channel times out,
the two clients need another on-chain transaction to settle
the payments. If two clients perform transactions frequently,
they would benefit from the batch processing which only
incurs two on-chain transactions. In addition to batch pro-
cessing, Lightning Network enables a third party to relay
payments as long as it has set up channels with the involved
users. Relaying payments would save setting up direct chan-
nels on-chain, further reducing on-chain transactions.
If the throughput of a blockchain without Lightning Net-
work is t , that with Lightning Network and no relays would
be tα where α is the compression level benefited from batch
processing. Lightning Network further improves throughput
with payment relays, which adds an additional layer of relay
nodes that could withhold transactions. No matter what the
topology of the payment graph is, Lightning Network with
n clients can at most reduce the number of on-chain transac-
tions to O(n), by using one relay node to relay all payments.
Thus, a fully connected payment graph (O(n2)) would benefit
most in throughput. At the same time, the centralization level
of relay nodes would change from N0 = n to N0 = 1. The
centralization-throughput product in this extreme case would
be ntα , the improvement of which comes only from batch
processing. Note that centralization of the relay nodes can
only withhold transactions without the ability of tampering
the transaction or history.
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4 PROBLEMS WITH
DECENTRALIZATION
We argue that blockchain decentralization introduce several
inherent problems. These problems do not occur only in
blockchain providers (physical nodes), which much attention
has been paid to, but in the full stack. Fig. 2 summarizes
decentralizations in different layers of public blockchains:
Physical Nodes. The physical nodes, which are in the bot-
tom layer, consist of a P2P network of miners. Physical nodes
in a public blockchain like Bitcoin and Ethereum are assumed
decentralized. However, this assumption does not entirely
hold since ASIC miners and mining pools skew the mining
power distribution (Sec. 4.1).
Platform Software. The platform software layer runs on
top of physical nodes. It includes the implementation of
the consensus algorithm and the smart contract runtime.
Public blockchain’s platform software is often developed,
maintained, and open sourced by a community of contribu-
tors. The impact is in many folds: First, the governing and
decision making is usually led by a “core” development com-
munity, leaders of which have significant influences on the
platform software development. Second, since the trust of
the platform software is critical and economically rewarded,
the development community, in many cases, has strong in-
centives to make the platform reliable. Third, the platform
software layer needs to be supported by the mining network.
For example, a new update of the platform software will not
happen or will fork the blockchain if it is rejected by the
mining network owners.
Smart Contract. Smart contracts or DApps [6] are the appli-
cations deployed on the blockchain platforms. The applica-
tion logics are encoded in smart contract code. The execution
of smart contracts is triggered by function calls from clients
or other smart contracts. The result of execution is reflected
in the state changes of blockchains (e.g., a change in user’s
account balance). As to be discussed in Sec. 4.3, the execution
of smart contract is fully replicated and sequential.
Client. The client layer serves the end users of smart con-
tracts. It takes user inputs and displays the end results to
users. The client layer only needs to interact with the plat-
form layer using standard APIs. It is completely open since
anyone is free to implement their own client.
In the rest of this section, we discuss three major problems
with blockchain decentralization, one in each layer.
4.1 Skewed Mining Power
The first problem brought by blockchain decentralization is
skewed mining power in PoWmining network. This problem
lays in the physical nodes layer, which stays in the bottom of
the blockchain stack. To leverage the decentralization of the
Physical Nodes
Platform Software
Smart Contract
Client
skewed
community driven
fully replicated and sequential
open
Figure 2: Decentralization of full-stack blockchains.
P2P mining network to reach consensus, a key assumption
of Nakamoto consensus [18] is that each mining node has
similar computation power thus similar probability to extend
the blockchain. However, there are two trends in mining
networks of the major blockchain systems: First, incentivized
by the surging price of cryptocurrencies, the mining power
of a single mining hardware grows exponentially, especially
since the introduction of ASICs that are purely designed
for performing crypto hashing. Second, since the number of
mining nodes increases dramatically, although the expected
profit of mining is still high ( thanks to the high price of
cryptocurrencies) , the variance of mining profit increase
significantly1. Thus, miners form mining pools in order to
stabilize profit.
As a result, the distribution of mining power is highly
skewed in real world. For example, as shown in a recent
measuring study [12], 90% of the mining power is controlled
by 16 miners in Bitcoin (160.1 decentralized) and 11 miners
of Ethereum (110.1decentralized). Moreover, top 4 Bitcoin
miners have more than 53% of the mining power in total
(40.47 decentralized), and top 3 Ethereum miners have more
than 61% of the mining power in total (30.39 decentralized).
This means the blockchain is effectively maintained by
very few distinct entities. Although happens rarely, 51% at-
tack does occur in real world. One example is the recent 51%
attack [24] to Bitcoin Gold [2] which leads to 18 million us
dollar worth loss. The skewed mining power demonstrate
considerable vulnerability of current public chains.
4.2 Scalability of Transaction Throughput
Second, we argue that the decentralized consensus algo-
rithms cause inherent scalability of blockchain transaction
throughput, regardless of detailed protocol implementations.
Scalability of blockchain transactions has been witnessed
in practice. For example, the peak transaction throughput
of Bitcoin and Ethereum are 3 txn/sec and 15 txn/sec [10],
which are insufficient for many performance critical applica-
tions. Here, for the first time, we show that this scalability
bottleneck is unavoidable, as long as the consensus algorithm
1One analogy is a lottery with positive expected return. Even if the return is
positive, for an individual, it is still a high probability to lose money (invest
on mining hardware and electricity but get zero block reward).
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requires consensus from all participants, e.g. PoW or PoS2.
To demonstrate that, we prove upper bounds of transaction
throughput of distributed consensus algorithms and show
that this upper bound is very low in real world settings.
To derive the upper bounds bound formally, we first re-
view the essential definitions of terms in blockchain systems.
In public blockchains, every participant shares a single global
state and reaches an agreement (with high probability) on
any computations on the global state. As a result, the latency
of a transaction, L, is determined 3 by the number of con-
firmations required (usually 6 in practice), C , and the time
interval of block generation, p:
L = C × p
For example, pBitcoin = 10 mins, which leads to LBitCoin =
60 mins; pEthereum = 15 secs (10 ∼ 20 secs in practice), which
leads to LEthereum = 1.5 mins.
Similarly, the max transaction throughput R, is deter-
mined by the time interval of block generation p and the
number of transactions in a block N . And N = b/s , where b
is the block size and s is size of each transaction:
R = b
s × p (1)
For example, the average transaction size on the Bitcoin
blockchain is 513.86 bytes over the last 6 years [22], and
the Bitcoin block size is 1 MB. It is easy to calculate that
RBitcoin ≈ 3.4 txn/sec. Similarly, we can get thatRethereum ≈
15 txn/sec, which is close to Ethereum’s peak performance
observed ( 15 txn/sec, Jan. 4, 2018) [10].
Below, we give an upper bound on the ideal transaction
throughput that a decentralized blockchain can achieve.
Theorem 4.1. Even ignoring the local computation time,
the transaction throughput a decentralized blockchain system
can achieve is less than:
R ≤ w
s
where s is the size of a transaction on blockchain, w is the
access bandwidth.
Proof. Let’s take a closer look at Eq. (1). p cannot be
infinitely small since it takes time to broadcast a block to
each node. Thus:
p ≥ l + b
w
where l is the network latency. Using the back of the envelope
calculation, we have:
R ≤ b
s(l + bw )
2DPoS sacrifices decentralization, and thus can achieve better scalability.
3Given the transaction is successfully written to the blockchain.
contract TokenContractFragment {
// Balances for each account
mapping(address=>uint256) balances;
// Get the token balance for account `tokenOwner `x
function balanceOf(address tokenOwner)
public constant returns (uint balance) {
return balances[tokenOwner ];
}
// Transfer the balance from owner 's account
// to another account
function transfer(address to, uint tokens)
public returns (bool success) {
...
Figure 3: An Example ERC20 Token Contract [9].
The only thing that we can adjust here is b. Let’s look at the
derivative on b:
dR
db
=
lw2
s(lw + b)2
The derivative is always positive. Thus, R is monotoni-
cally increasing with b. The upper bound of the transaction
throughput is when b →∞:
lim
x→∞
x
s(l + xw )
=
w
s
□
It is worth noting that w should be reasonably and con-
servatively chosen so that the system allows the majority of
the mining nodes to be able to collect mining rewards. In a
recent measurement study [12], 67% Bitcoin mining nodes
have larger than 23.3Mbps access bandwidth; 90% Bitcoin
mining nodes have larger than 5.7Mbps access bandwidth;
the access bandwidth for 67% and 90% Ethereum nodes are
11.2Mbps and 3.4Mbps, respectively. So even if we ignore
network congestion control, block verification time, and as-
suming infinite block size, the Bitcoin throughput is at most
1.1K txn/sec and Ethereum throughput is at most 700 txn/sec
(using the 90% users’ bandwidth). In fact, the actual through-
put is much smaller than this theoretical limit.
4.3 Scalability of Smart Contract Execution
Apart from the scalability of transaction throughput, smart
contract execution in current decentralized blockchain sys-
tems does not scale as well. In particular, the following two
problems prevent scaling smart contract execution.
Fully Replicated and Single Threaded Execution In cur-
rent decentralized blockchain systems like Bitcoin or Ethereum,
the effective execution of smart contracts (the execution re-
sult that is eventually included in the blockchain) is repeated
in every mining node. So the effective computation power of
the entire blockchain system is essentially the same as single
node. In addition, the runtimes of smart contracts (VMs) are
single threaded. Thus, it is impossible to leverage parallelism
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within a single node as well. As a result, the computation
power of the entire Bitcoin or Ethereum network, which
consists of more than hundreds of thousands machines, is
less than a modern mobile phone.
Sequential Programming Model Even if the smart con-
tract execution is parallelized, we argue that it is still hard to
scale smart contract execution since the current smart con-
tracts are written using a sequential programmingmodel. For
example, Fig. 3 shows the ERC20 token contract [9], one of
the most popular smart contracts used in Ethereum for many
ICOs. It is written in Solidity [21], a JavaScript-style language.
It has global variables, such as balances, which stores the
token balance of each account. Given the generality of the
smart contract language (Solidity is Turing complete), it is
challenging to scale up the execution of smart contracts as
they are currently written.
5 RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
We propose three research directions to solve or circumvent
problems with decentralization.
• Mining power should be more decentralized by design.
• Other forms of trust should be considered, when pos-
sible, to replace decentralization.
• Smart contract should be scaled to achieve a higher
scalability in overall.
5.1 Democratizing Mining Power
One key factor that leads to skewed mining power is the
emergence of specialized mining hardware, especially ASICs.
Specialized mining hardware has outperformed personal
computers by orders of magnitude in terms of both mining
power (number of hashes per second) and mining energy
efficiency (number of hashes per watt). In addition, special-
ized mining hardware is usually very expensive. As a result,
they mostly end up in the hands of a small number of groups,
such as owners of big mining farms and ASIC miner manu-
facturers.
One possible approach to democratizing mining power
is to design ASIC proof hashing algorithms for PoW. For
example, Litecoin [16] and Dogecoin [7] use scrypt, a hash
algorithm that is designed to be ASIC proof by its high mem-
ory consumption. However, this proved to be extremely dif-
ficult since the ASIC improved as well. As an example, in
2014, specialized ASIC mining hardware was launched for
scrypt-based cryptocurrencies [3].
5.2 Trust, Not Necessary Decentralization
As shown in Sec. 4.2, there is an inherent trade-off between
decentralization and transaction throughput. Ultimately, de-
centralization is a means to democratize trust rather than the
goal. There are other ways of ensuring trust. For example,
verifiable computation and secured hardware [5, 23] allows
clients to run code on untrusted platforms. In doing so, an
untrusted platform generates verifiable proofs for clients to
vet the correctness of computation. With verifiable compu-
tation, trusting the majority of system nodes does not need
to be assumed any more.
As another example, formal verification and certified pro-
gramming [14, 15] allow programmers to provide a math-
ematical proof showing that a blockchain implementation
meets its specification by construction. This could be used
to eliminate the unintended behaviors in blockchain imple-
mentations.
5.3 Scaling Smart Contract Execution
To achieve scalable execution of smart contracts, it is time
to rethink the design of both the programming model and
the runtime. First, new programming primitives need to be
introduced to make parallel execution of smart contracts
possible. For example, many programming constructs, such
as concurrent data structures [17], can be borrowed from
extensive programming languages research in past decades.
Second, the smart contract runtime needs to be redesigned
to support parallel execution of smart contracts and at the
same time still maintains a deterministic transaction order
and keeps all the transactional guarantees. Many existing
approaches in databases and systems should be revisited and
adopted to smart contract runtime [1].
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we defined a quantitativemeasure of blockchain
decentralization and comprehensively compared the decen-
tralization aspect of current blockchain systems using this
measure. We identified key challenges in blockchain decen-
tralization: skewed mining power distribution, inherent con-
flicts between decentralization and scalability (we proved
the first upper bound of transaction throughput of decen-
tralized blockchain systems), and fully replicated and single
threaded execution and sequential programming model pre-
vent scaling smart contract execution. Finally, we proposed
three possible research directions towards solving these chal-
lenges.We believe that adopting ideas frommany other fields,
such as formal methods, programming languages/compilers,
and databases, could provide new approaches to address the
trade-offs between scalability and decentralization.
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